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Picking up the Pieces: Finding Unity after the
Communications Decency Act Section 230
Jurisprudential Clash
I. INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONAL LIABILITY MEETS THE INTERNET
In January 1985, Michael Savage submitted a personal service
classified advertisement to Soldier of Fortune magazine.1 Savage
was a young Vietnam veteran seeking employment as a bodyguard,
courier, or mercenary—jobs that could utilize his “special skills.”2
The overwhelming majority of the 30 to 40 weekly phone calls he
received were solicitations for his participation in criminal
activity.3 Succumbing to the lucrative nature of these jobs, Savage
accepted one in August 1985.4 He and an accomplice were to kill
Richard Braun, an Atlanta businessman whose own business
partners had hired Savage.5 On August 26, 1985, as Braun was
driving down the driveway of his home with his 16-year-old son,
Savage’s accomplice stepped in front of Braun’s car and
repeatedly fired his pistol into the car.6 A wounded Braun rolled
out of his vehicle onto the ground, where Savage’s partner shot
him twice in the head.7
Braun’s sons brought suit against Soldier of Fortune magazine,
alleging its negligence in publishing Savage’s “gun for hire” ad.8
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Savage’s ad should
have alerted a reasonably prudent publisher to the risk that Savage
was soliciting illicit jobs.9 As the publisher of Savage’s ad, the
magazine was liable for $2 million in damages for the wrongful
death of Richard Braun.10
Twenty-five years later, murder remains a danger in every U.S.
city, and the Savage scenario is not unrealistic. The United States
has embraced the Internet revolution, with its citizens quickly
adapting their businesses and social lives to the opportunities of
Copyright 2012, by RYAN FRENCH.
1. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th
Cir. 1992).
2. Id. (“GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs.
Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and other
special skills. All jobs considered. [contact information].”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1122.
10. Id. at 1114.
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cyberspace. At least one tech-savvy Savage imitator has already
offered his mercenary services online.11 In fact, the Soldier of
Fortune scenario could occur almost identically on the Internet
today, but with one important difference: the murder victim’s
family would probably recover nothing from the website. As long
as the website did not help create the ad, it would be completely
protected from liability by the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”).12
The CDA is an unyielding federal statute that protects websites
from liability for anything third parties create or post online.13 It
contains one of the most powerful legal immunities available—a
complete protection for any content placed on a website by a third
party, regardless of the website’s awareness of the content.14 The
CDA is a formidable legal hurdle to plaintiffs who have suffered
injury via the Internet. Victims of online housing discrimination,15
cruel gossip,16 and horrendously defamatory Internet profiles17 are
all equally unable to sue the websites that host the offending
content.
However, there are many who question the far reach of the
CDA’s protections. These extreme scenarios seem to spout
injustice; but not all is as it seems. The immunity provided by the
statute’s modest four sentences has inspired volumes of
11. In 2008, the disgruntled girlfriend of an Irish millionaire was sentenced
to six years in prison after arranging for the “accidental death” of her lover and
his two sons. Although she stumbled upon a willing assassin through a “Hitmen
for Hire” website, the plot was foiled. Henry McDonald, ‘Caring, Loving and a
Decent Lady’—Millionaire Pleads for Woman who Sent Hitman to Kill Him,
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/
nov/04/sharon-collins-pj-howard-hitman.
12. Or so the overwhelming majority of courts have suggested. See, e.g.,
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting immunity if a website “does not create or
develop the information . . . .”) (quotations and brackets omitted).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
15. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (granting classified ad website
immunity from liability for discriminatory comments of its users who were
seeking roommates with certain sexual, racial, or religious qualities).
16. See Sunny Hostin, Online Campus Gossips Won’t Show Their Faces,
CNN.COM (Mar. 17, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-03-17/justice/sunny.
juicy_1_web-site-posts-page-six?_s=PM:CRIME (discussing the inability of
victims to recover against gossip websites that allow anyone to anonymously
post rumors about anyone else).
17. See, e.g., Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting
website immunity for a fake profile that was opened on the website under
someone else’s identity to mock the Oklahoma City bombing).
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interpretive guidance.18 Without any Supreme Court decision to
guide the federal circuits, the current CDA jurisprudence is an
amalgamation of interpretive strategies and statutory approaches
that appear to be hopelessly intertwined. If Savage were to post his
advertisement online today on Soldieroffortune.com (“SOF.com”),
the website’s liability might be different depending on which
interpretative approach the court applied.19 One court might find
that as long as Savage’s ad was created without the website’s help,
the website would be immune.20 Another court might find that the
website would lose its immunity if it knew about the ad’s
existence,21 while yet another court might find that the website
would gain immunity only by taking steps to restrict access to the
ad.22 Finally, another court might find that even if the website
helped Savage create the ad, it could still gain immunity if it took
steps to restrict access to it.23
Chiefly, this Comment posits that there is indeed one superior
interpretation of the CDA, and that there is not nearly as much
disagreement as courts have suggested. In order to bring
consistency to the jurisprudence, courts must not only accept this
approach, but also actively discard the remnants of failed
approaches. Part II.A of this Comment lays the foundation of the
CDA’s congressional development. Part II.B describes the
jurisprudential development of the statute, with particular attention
to three of the most prominent federal circuit cases that have
interpreted it. In Part III, this Comment analyzes the differing
approaches to the CDA—both the most widely accepted and the
less prominent approaches. In Part IV, this Comment posits that a
unified Zeran–publisher approach is best suited for adoption by all
of the courts. Part IV also challenges those particular courts that
have pioneered the jurisprudence to refine their methodology,
renounce misleading reasoning, and finally bring harmony to CDA
interpretation and application.

18. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) (overturning
the state appellate court’s decision to adopt a different interpretation of the
CDA); see also discussion infra Parts III–IV.
19. Where SOF.com is used in this Comment, the situations and web
address are merely hypothetical. There is no evidence that such ads are placed
on Soldier of Fortune’s website, and it appears that the website does not even
permit classified ads to be displayed online. See SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
MAGAZINE, http://www.sofmag.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
20. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B.
21. See discussion infra Part III.E.
22. See discussion infra Part III.C.
23. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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II. A HISTORY OF CONFLICT: WHERE THE CDA BEGAN AND WHERE
IT IS GOING
Only one section of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230, concerns
website immunity.24 Passed by Congress in February 1996, § 230
originally served only as an amendment to the broader CDA.25
Unlike the other provisions of the CDA, § 230 caused little stir
during its swift passage through Congress.26 Because of § 230’s
role as an amendment, it is first necessary to consider the
background and history of its legislative context, the CDA.
A. The Communications Decency Act
On February 1, 1995, Senator J. James Exon introduced to the
Senate what he characterized as the most important legislation on
which he had ever worked27—the Communications Decency Act.28
Senator Exon and the bill’s cosponsor, Senator Dan Coats,
pointedly addressed the U.S. Senate, cautioning that the
proliferation of online pornography was threatening to infect every
computer and child in America.29
1. A Noble Cause
To combat the perceived threat of rampant online pornography,
Senator Exon proposed the heart of the CDA, a revision of 47
U.S.C. § 223. His revision extended the decency and obscenity
standards that already protected cable and telephone users to a new
telecommunication device––the Internet.30 Senator Exon was
primarily concerned with the ease with which children could
access obscene material on the Internet.31 Many in the Senate
shared Senator Exon’s concerns, but many also disapproved of the
sweepingly broad nature of his proposal.32 The Exon–Coats
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
25. Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act
to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172 (2006).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
27. 141 CONG. REC. 15,505 (1995).
28. Id. at 3,203.
29. Id. Senator Exon introduced his legislation by announcing, “[T]he
information superhighway should not become a red light district.” Id.
30. Id.
31. There is a disturbing amount of pornography on the Internet, Senator
Exon reasoned, and it is never more than “a few clicks away from any child with
a computer.” Id. at 16,009 (statement of Sen. Exon).
32. See, e.g., Id. at 16,013 (statement of Sen. Feingold). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, of which the CDA was only a part, actually
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amendment made it a federal crime to display or describe “patently
offensive” content to persons under age 18, or merely to
knowingly transmit with a telecommunications device any
“communication which is obscene or indecent.”33
Some senators feared that the CDA’s language would be used
to punish the messenger.34 They likened its approach to holding the
mailman liable for the contents of the mail and feared an e-mail
service could be held criminally liable for an offensive e-mail
message.35 In the end, the Exon–Coats language was largely
incorporated into the final CDA.36 However, to secure its passage,
Senator Exon agreed to add what was, at the time, a deceptively
uncontroversial House amendment: § 230.37
2. The Catalyst: Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy
On August 4, 1995, Representative Christopher Cox proposed
an amendment to the Exon–Coats CDA bill.38 Entitled “Online
Family Empowerment,” the amendment was cosponsored by
Representative Ron Wyden and sought to eliminate some of the
perceived wording problems of the proposed CDA.39 The
Congressmen believed Internet services, website operators, and
families were better situated than the government to control
obscene or offensive online content.40 However, they worried that
the existing legal scheme actually discouraged websites from
participating in the content-monitoring process.41 They further
worried that the Exon–Coats CDA revision only exacerbated this
problem.42 Representative Cox pointed to a recent court case,
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., which suggested that

contained a broad deregulatory scheme aimed at reducing government
involvement in the telecommunications industry. See 142 CONG. REC. 2,042–43
(1996) (statement of Sen. Dole).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2002) (prior to amendment).
34. 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
35. Id.
36. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859–60
(1997).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
38. 141 CONG. REC. 22,044 (1995).
39. Id. at 22,044–46.
40. See Id. at 22,045.
41. Id.
42. See id.
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courts would punish websites that tried to screen out offensive
content far more harshly than those websites that did nothing.43
In Stratton, a New York appellate court held Prodigy, a website
operator, liable for defamatory comments posted by an anonymous
user on the website’s message board.44 In similar cases, other
courts had refused to find such liability, because the websites knew
nothing of the content.45 The Stratton court ironically reasoned that
because Prodigy made efforts to screen inappropriate content, it
therefore shouldered the burden of liability for any content that did
get through its screening process.46 Although the Stratton decision
occurred in the context of defamation liability, it spurred fears that
an online service provider might be held liable for any illegal
content displayed using its service.47 “[T]hat is backward,”
Representative Cox stated, because “[w]e want to encourage
people like Prodigy . . . to do everything possible . . . to help us
control [online content].”48
3. The Shield of § 230
As a result, the Cox–Wyden amendment purported to do two
things.49 First, it would protect “computer Good Samaritans,”
online service providers that take steps to filter indecent or
offensive material, from “taking on liability such as incurred in the
Prodigy case.”50 Second, it would “establish as the policy of the
United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the
Federal Government of what is on the Internet . . . .”51
Representatives Cox and Wyden feared that without their
amendment, the CDA would discourage companies and individuals
from developing or using technologies to screen indecent
communications.52 After Stratton, such entities might fear liability
for failed attempts at screening content.53 Other representatives
feared that courts might begin holding websites liable for all third43. Id.; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
44. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *13–14.
45. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 931–32 (E.D.
Wash. 1992), aff’d, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
46. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10.
47. 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
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party content, regardless of the website’s actions.54 The rest of the
House apparently agreed, and the Cox–Wyden amendment
subsequently obtained House approval by a vote of 420 to 4.55 It
was adopted into the Exon–Coats CDA modification with only
minor changes.56 With the passage of the CDA in February 1996, it
became codified in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c):
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material.
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)
[subparagraph (A)].57
It is apparent from its structure that § 230(c) has two distinct
parts. Section 230(c)(1) specifically provides only that a “provider
or user of an interactive computer service” shall not be treated as a
publisher or speaker of third-party content.58 Whether this
provision is merely descriptive or provides some kind of protection
is one of the principal debates surrounding § 230.59 Next, §
54. See Id. at 22,046 (Rep. Goodlatte remarked, “[t]here is no way that any
of those entities, like Prodigy, can take the responsibility to edit out information
that is going to be coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their
bulletin board.”).
55. Id. at 22,054.
56. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
57. Title 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) contains the active provision of the Cox–
Wyden amendment. Sections 230(a) and (b), respectively, contain the
congressional findings praising the advancements offered by the Internet and the
congressional policy statements encouraging the development of the Internet
and fighting criminal activity. Section 230(d), not relevant here, contains an
obligation to notify customers of parental control protections. Sections 230(e)
and (f) contain certain exemptions and definitions, respectively.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
59. See discussion infra Parts III.A–C.
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230(c)(2) specifically provides that a “provider or user of an
interactive computer service” shall not be held civilly liable
because of attempts to restrict content or to enable users to restrict
content.60 From its wording, § 230 therefore appears to immunize
certain websites from two forms of liability: (1) the inequitable
Stratton dilemma, whereby a website could be held liable as the
publisher of all information because of its attempt to filter some of
the information; and (2) liability to those whose content a website
filters, although the content is constitutionally protected.61 Roughly
translated, websites would not face liability for not blocking
enough content or for blocking too much content.
The statute also makes a crucial distinction between two classes
of cyber-entities, “interactive computer services” and “information
content providers.”62 According to the statute’s definitions, any
participant in the entire Internet connection process is presumptively
an interactive computer service.63 However, if interactive computer
services or people accessing the service create any information, they
acquire the status of information content provider.64 Under §
230(c)(1), interactive computer services cannot be treated as the
publisher or speaker of a content provider’s content.65 Thus, the
relevant distinction made by these terms is one of content creation.
Individual websites fall into both of these categories. A website is
the content provider of any content that it supplies, but it is only an
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006).
61. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). This immunity effectively eliminates
two disincentives websites might have to participating in the content-monitoring
process: the fear of liability for not blocking enough, and the fear of liability for
blocking too much.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2–3) (2006).
(2) Interactive computer service. The term “interactive computer
service” means any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider. The term “information content
provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
There is a third cyber-entity defined in § 230(f), an “access software provider.”
However, the statute indicates that this is but a sub-class of the “interactive
computer service” category, and the only place in § 230 that access software
providers are referenced is in the definition of interactive computer services. See
47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2006).
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2006).
64. See id.
65. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
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interactive computer service where it merely allows users to add
information or post comments.66
B. The Courts Square Off: The Jurisprudential Development of the
CDA
The opposition and doubts that the Exon–Coats revision of
CDA § 223 faced during its congressional passage soon proved to
be well-founded. In fact, on the same day the CDA was signed into
law by President Clinton, 20 plaintiffs filed suit, alleging the
unconstitutionality of § 223.67 It took only one week for a federal
court to enter a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of
the overly broad provisions of the statute.68 However, § 230
remained untouched, and was suddenly detached from the problem
it was intended to solve.69
The CDA’s passage soon had another unforeseen consequence.
As the jurisprudential interpretation of the statute unfolded, the
previously uncontroversial § 230 became the center of a heated
debate.70 As it turned out, the few sentences of § 230(c) were not
so easily applied. Despite the plethora of cases interpreting it, a
mere handful of these cases contain what are by far the most
influential interpretations, applications, and limitations of the
statute.
1. The Fourth Circuit Strikes First: Zeran v. AOL
Despite the obscenity- and indecency-oriented nature of the
CDA, nothing in the wording of § 230 restricts its application to
such situations.71 Section 230 saw its first interpretation in the case
66. Courts have had little trouble accepting this proposition. See, e.g., FTC
v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009); Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 2008).
67. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997).
68. ACLU v. Reno, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1617 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the same district court’s finding of the
unconstitutionality of the content-based indecency provisions of § 223. Reno,
521 U.S. 844, 885.
69. See Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to
Cyberspace: Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation
for Internet Service Providers, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 256
(2000).
70. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The
Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2001).
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2006) (encompassing obscenity, filthiness,
violence, harassment, and anything objectionable).
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of Zeran v. AOL, Inc., in which the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, was
the victim of a cruel Internet hoax.72 An unknown perpetrator
claimed to be Zeran and provided his contact information on an
AOL online bulletin board that allowed users to post publicly
available content.73 On this forum, the perpetrator began
advertising t-shirts and other merchandise “glorifying the
bombing” of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995.74 After
receiving dozens of threatening phone calls, Zeran learned of the
source of the prank.75 He immediately contacted AOL, demanding
that it remove the postings.76 However, even after being notified,
AOL failed to prevent continued postings.77 Zeran filed suit against
AOL, alleging AOL’s negligence in failing to adequately respond
to the malicious postings despite having been made aware of
them.78 In response, AOL claimed immunity under the newly
enacted § 230.79
The Fourth Circuit considered the extent to which § 230
forbade AOL from being held liable for the anonymously
contributed content.80 The court highlighted the importance of
uninhibited Internet communication and determined that,
accordingly, § 230’s immunity should be “broad.”81 “Specifically,
§ 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”82 Zeran’s claim
would thus be barred if holding AOL liable placed it in the role of
publisher.83 To evade this reasoning, Zeran delved into the
common law definition of “publishers,” claiming that AOL was
not a publisher as recognized by the CDA.84
Zeran contended that § 230(c)(1) applied only to a very precise
notion of “publisher” that should be interpreted in the context of
traditional defamation law.85 Traditional defamation law allows for
two different classifications of those who are responsible for
disseminating and publicizing information.86 The publisher
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir.1997).
Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1126.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 331–32.
Id.
Id. at 332.
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classification is reserved for those persons or entities that actually
communicate a given statement, like an author or a newspaper.87
However, the classification of distributor is given to those persons
or entities that are merely conduits for the publication efforts of
someone else, and includes newsstands and booksellers.88 The
reason for the distinction lies in the respective degree of
knowledge that distributors have compared to actual publishers.89
Publishers are likely to be aware of the contents of their
publications, whereas distributors cannot possibly be expected to
know the contents of every publication they sell.90 Although
publishers of information are strictly liable for the contents of their
communications, distributors are liable only if they are aware of
defamatory statements.91
Zeran conceded that the CDA forbids holding AOL strictly
liable as the publisher of the damaging comments.92 However, he
claimed that he was not trying to place AOL in the role of
“publisher,” and therefore it did not qualify for § 230’s
protections.93 Instead, Zeran argued, because AOL had actual
knowledge of the comments, he was seeking only to hold AOL
liable as a “distributor,” something that § 230 did not forbid.94
Zeran’s argument did not persuade the Fourth Circuit.95 It
found that the distributor classification is merely one subset of the
broad common law notion of a publisher.96 More importantly, the
court noted that Congress passed § 230 specifically to prevent
websites from avoiding attempts to screen content.97 The Zeran
court concluded that distributor liability threatened this
congressional goal because the prospect of liability for knowledge
might discourage websites from allowing themselves to become
aware of offensive content.98
Suddenly, the difficulties of allocating responsibility on an
anonymous forum like the Internet were a disturbing reality. If the
websites could not be held liable for the content, then, quite often,
nobody could. Only § 230(c)(2) explicitly precludes any civil
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331−32.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 332–33.
Id. at 333.
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liability, and it is limited to Good Samaritan screeners; but the
Fourth Circuit interpreted § 230(c)(1) as conferring a wholly
separate immunity.99 The court held that § 230(c)(1), “[b]y its plain
language . . . creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.”100
Courts have considered the Zeran decision to be the
“fountainhead” of the “[n]ear-unanimous case law” holding that §
230 provides immunity to websites from lawsuits that seek to hold
them liable for others’ contributions.101 However, Zeran has never
gained complete acceptance among scholars,102 and some courts
have signaled that they have no intention of adopting Zeran’s
broad rule.103
2. The Seventh Circuit Answers: Doe v. GTE and Chicago
Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist
If the Fourth Circuit has taken the broadest view of § 230, the
Seventh Circuit has taken the narrowest. In two separate panel
opinions, Judge Frank Easterbrook has seriously questioned the
validity of current interpretations of § 230 immunity.104 In fact,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, he questioned whether § 230(c)(1)
actually creates any form of immunity.105
In Doe v. GTE and Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights v. Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit noted the possibility of an
alternative reading of § 230(c)(1) that does recognize some
99. Id. at 330.
100. Id.
101. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688–89 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2008) (“Virtually all subsequent courts that have construed Section 230(c)(1)
have followed Zeran.”); see, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 151–
52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. See, e.g., David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the
Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147 (1997); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail
and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is a Good Thing,
6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2000); David Wiener, Negligent Publication of
Statements Posted on Electronic Bulletin Boards: Is There Any Liability Left
After Zeran?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 905 (1999); see also Barrett, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 154 n.8 (listing discordant analyses by scholars).
103. See Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 154.
104. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm.
for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
105. GTE, 347 F.3d at 660.
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protection, but not to the extent of Zeran.106 Instead of an
immunity for any information originating from third parties, the
court reasoned that § 230(c)(1) may only prevents any form of
liability for publishing.107 The most obvious example of such
liability is the defamation cause of action, which requires that
someone actually publish the defamatory information.108 However,
this publisher immunity is also interpreted to prevent liability for
any actions that are traditionally done by publishers, such as
screening, displaying, removing, or editing content.109 Withholding
determination of the issue of § 230 immunity in GTE, the Seventh
Circuit did not commit to this “publisher approach” until
Craigslist.110 In Craigslist, the court found that classified ad
website Craigslist.org could not be held liable for any of the
discriminatory housing ads of its customers.111 Because any theory
of liability essentially punished the website for merely publishing
customer ads, § 230(c)(1) precluded liability.112
3. A New Battlefront: The Ninth Circuit and Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not purport to
create a new interpretation of § 230, but it did suggest a limit to
Zeran. It did so with a strict determination of whether a given
website helped to create the content in question.113 By its plain
language, § 230(c)(1) does not apply to every website or access
provider.114 Immunity is available only to a website if it is not an
information content provider, that is, if it did not create the illegal
content in question.115
In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, determined that a website that requires third parties
to create illegal content is to be considered the creator of that
106. Id.; Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666.
107. GTE, 347 F.3d at 660.
108. Id.
109. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). These
activities are considered to be publisher actions, even if the cause of action does
not specifically require the element of publishing. See id.
110. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666.
111. Id. at 669–71.
112. Id. at 671.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116–124.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
115. See id. (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
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content as well.116 In Roommates.com, the website was accused of
violating the Fair Housing Act, a federal law that forbids
discrimination on the basis of certain protected traits in the context
of housing.117 Roommates.com operated a website that served to
match those offering roommates or living arrangements with those
seeking them.118 An integral part of its registration process was a
series of questions in which registrants were required to indicate
their own gender as well as their preferences regarding a
roommate’s gender, sexual orientation, and parental status.119
In determining the applicability of § 230 immunity, the court
did not hesitate to recognize the website’s users, who indicate their
discriminatory preferences, as content providers.120 However, the
court went a step further by also characterizing Roommates.com as
a content provider.121 By leaving its users with only discriminatory
alternatives, it had thus contributed to the development of
discriminatory content and was outside the scope of § 230
immunity.122 This interpretation is potentially in conflict with a
literal reading of the Zeran holding, which precludes all “liability
for information that originates with third parties.”123 Thus, if a
website encourages or induces illegal content, it may still be
considered a de facto content provider.124
III. AFTER THE DUST SETTLES: SALVAGING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF § 230
There is little doubt that § 230 has caused more controversy
than Congress ever envisioned. From its uncontroversial roots, §
230 has quickly spawned a burgeoning record of judicial decisions
and academic commentary. Although the jurisprudence has
arguably followed the Zeran decision,125 such a generalization
116. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 1162 n.4.
118. Id. at 1161–62.
119. Id. at 1164–65.
120. Id. at 1165.
121. Id. at 1166.
122. Id.
123. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
124. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (“If you don’t encourage illegal
content, . . . you will be immune.”).
125. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2008); see, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 151–52 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.
2003).
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masks a complicated and ongoing debate. Parts of this debate are
obscure because different courts may reach the same conclusion
with regard to the ultimate liability of similarly situated
defendants, yet use wholly different interpretations of the statute.
Many of the courts even cross-cite and quote conflicting analyses
in other judicial opinions in support of their own opinions.
Although the case law has not explicitly acknowledged all of them,
there are no less than five distinct judicial interpretations of § 230,
and each one of them alters the degree of protection given to a
website.
A. The Fourth Circuit, Zeran v. AOL, and Third-Party Immunity:
Is There a Victor?
As the first judicial decision to interpret § 230, Zeran both
gained quick judicial acceptance and caused immediate
controversy.126 Its “third-party approach” has been characterized as
the broadest possible interpretation of the CDA, but such
complaints have done little to deter its influence.127 At present,
Zeran’s expansive holding has been adopted by as many as seven
of the federal circuits.128 Under Zeran’s third-party approach, §
230 does two things: (1) Section 230(c)(1) contains a broad
immunity for any content originating with third parties, and (2) §
230(c)(2) contains a broad immunity for “Good Samaritan”
content-blockers.129 If the Zeran third-party approach were applied
126. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980,
986 (10th Cir. 2000) (fully adopting Zeran holding); Sheridan, supra note 102
(disapproving of Zeran’s broad interpretation).
127. See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (“[C]ourts have merely latched on
to Zeran’s language [to] grant broad, if not in fact, limitless, immunity . . . .”).
128. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit, while
rejecting Zeran, explicitly attributed it to five federal circuits. Id. These five
circuits are the Fourth, Tenth, Third, First, and Ninth Circuits. See Zeran, 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Zeran); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Zeran); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st
Cir. 2007) (impliedly adopting Zeran); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that § 230 provides broad immunity “when a third person or entity that
created or developed the information” furnishes it to a website for publication).
At least two other federal circuits––the Eighth and the Fifth––have adopted
Zeran-type legal standards. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2010) (reaching a holding identical to Zeran); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the CDA to “prohibi[t] claims against
Web-based interactive computer services based on their publication of thirdparty content.”).
129. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
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to Mr. Savage’s hypothetical Internet ventures, SOF.com would be
completely immune from liability for Savage’s ad because the ad
content originated from a third party. Zeran’s holding provides
considerable protection to websites and applies even if the website
is aware of the content.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Answer––Publisher Immunity
Zeran’s third-party interpretation has had no shortage of critics.
Judicial critics of Zeran have been fewer, but there are some courts
that have fervently rejected its analysis. The most prominent of
these is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Its rejection of
Zeran’s third-party approach may seem trivial, but understanding
the Seventh Circuit’s disagreement is vital to tracing its effects
upon other decisions and other circuits.
1. No Truce: The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in Craigslist
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist, the Seventh
Circuit specifically rejected the Zeran holding.130 The district court
placed particular emphasis on Zeran’s extension of immunity from
all “information originating with a third-party . . . .”131 The court
perceived this holding as conflicting with the actual wording of §
230(c)(1), which only “bars those causes of action that would
require treating an [interactive computer service] as a publisher of
third-party content.”132 According to the district court, the Zeran
interpretation is unsupported by the language of § 230 and
effectively creates a “limitless immunity.”133
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and
explicitly rejected the third-party approach of Zeran.134 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit adopted a “publisher approach,” refusing to find a
website liable under any cause of action that punishes the website
for being a publisher.135 Under this approach, websites are immune
130. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
131. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 697.
134. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008).
135. Id. at 671. Several courts applying this “publisher immunity” phrase it
as a three-part test that mirrors the statutory wording of § 230(c): (1) the website
must qualify as an interactive computer service, (2) the objectionable
information must be information provided by another, and (3) the claim must
require treatment of the website as “the publisher.” See, e.g., Universal
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421–22 (1st Cir. 2007); F.T.C.
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for exercising traditional publisher functions, such as displaying,
removing, or censoring content.136 Faced with the publisher
approach, SOF.com would still be immune from liability for Mr.
Savage’s ad because the website’s only role in the entire scheme
was as a publisher who displayed the ad.
2. Shifting Alliances: The Publisher Approach Gains Support
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in requiring the element of
publication. The Ninth Circuit has echoed the concerns of the
Seventh Circuit, warning that providing § 230 immunity anytime a
website used third-party content would “eviscerate” the statute.137
The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the threshold question
for § 230 immunity is whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold a
website accountable as the “publisher or speaker of third-party
content.”138 In fact, this view of § 230 is emerging as the preferred
interpretation throughout the federal circuits.139 One might wonder
how this is even possible, considering the “near-unanimous”
consensus that has supposedly evolved in support of Zeran’s
holding.140 This conflict presents one of the more confusing
considerations for courts applying § 230. The third-party approach
and the publisher approach have been viewed as fundamentally
different, yet, in many instances, they both find support within the
same judicial decision.

v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1196 (10th Cir. 2009); Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).
136. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. Some causes of action are easy to identify
as publisher claims, like defamation, because one of its specific elements is
publication. Id. at 1106–09. However, this determination is not always easy,
with plaintiffs often disguising their “publisher treatment” claims as negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, and invasion of privacy actions. See, e.g., id.
(negligence); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (negligent
misrepresentation and negligence); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (negligence and false light privacy claims).
137. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008).
138. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101.
139. See Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 421–22 (1st Cir. 2007) (adopting
publisher requirement); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.
2003) (same); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d
250, 258 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008)
(same); Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Johnson v. Arden,
614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 (9th Cir.
2009) (same); Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).
140. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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3. Hints of Agreement: Comparing Zeran’s Third-Party
Immunity to Craigslist’s Publisher Immunity
The Craigslist district court opinion provides a detailed
breakdown of the supposed differences between Zeran’s thirdparty approach and the Seventh Circuit’s publisher approach.141
Principally, the Craigslist court posited that Zeran’s holding is far
too broad, that its definition of publisher activities is also too
broad, and that courts are applying it almost blindly in practice.142
However, if these differences are exaggerated, then there is the
possibility of sweeping agreement among the federal circuits.
a. The Shield of § 230(c)(1): Immunity or Imagination?
The Seventh Circuit opinions in GTE and Craigslist contribute
greatly to the apparent discrepancy between the two approaches. In
both cases, the court questioned whether § 230(c)(1) “creates any
form of immunity.”143 After all, it is § 230(c)(2) that is actually
phrased as an immunity for Good Samaritan screeners.144 The
Craigslist district court noted that courts following Zeran fail to
address this divergence in the statutory language.145 However, the
Craigslist court failed to explain how its interpretation of §
230(c)(1) actually offers something that is not, for all intents and
purposes, also an immunity.146 In reality, the effect of the Craigslist
holding is identical to the holding of Zeran and its progeny: no
website can face liability for publishing third-party content.
b. Illusions of Disagreement: The Substantive Effect of
Craigslist’s Distinction
Taken literally, Zeran’s third-party approach immunizes a
website from liability for any third-party content.147 The publisher
approach supplies an immunity-like protection for publishing any
third-party content. It also purports to limit protection to a
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
144. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006) (entitled “Protection for ‘Good
Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”).
145. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693–94.
146. Id.
147. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“[Section] 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service.”).
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website’s publication decisions such as displaying, reviewing,
editing, withdrawing, and deciding whether to publish content.148
However, one would be hard-pressed to hypothesize even one
scenario where this distinction truly matters. It would require a
website to somehow display a third party’s content without
publishing it, a seemingly impossible situation. Because publishing
merely means “to disseminate to the public,” as a medium of
information display, anything that a website does is publishing.149
The “narrower” reading adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Craigslist is not narrower at all when everything that a website
does is inherently some form of publishing.
Further supporting the superficiality of this distinction is the
Zeran opinion itself. Other parts of that opinion confirm that the
Fourth Circuit meant to make no distinction between its holding
and holdings like that in Craigslist. The Zeran court devoted most
of its analysis to the publisher determination, and even specifically
stated, “[Section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims
that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s
role.”150 However, instead of acknowledging that the Zeran
opinion also establishes a requirement of publishing activity, the
Craigslist court dismissed this language as an “internal
inconsistency” that lessens the persuasiveness of the entire Zeran
opinion.151
c. “Publishing” in Zeran vs. “Publishing” in Craigslist
Even where the Zeran court discussed a “publisher”
requirement, the district court in Craigslist maintained that the two
courts’ definitions of publisher activities were in hopeless
conflict.152 The Craigslist court worried that Zeran’s definition of
publisher functions, which includes altering third party content,
would permit a website to actually create content under the guise
of altering it.153 In such a case, the website could be immune from
liability under the third-party approach for content it actually
148. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
149. See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (defining “publish” to mean “to
make public announcement of” or “to disseminate to the public”) (quoting
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 944 (10th ed. 1999)).
150. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).
151. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
152. Id.
153. Id. Consider the possibility of a comment posted to a website that states,
“John Smith is not a liar,” which the website operator alters to say, “John Smith
is a liar.” According to the Craigslist court, such an alteration could theoretically
be defamatory but protected as a publisher action under Zeran. See id.
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created, because it changed content that originated from a third
party.154 Although this is technically true under a literal reading of
Zeran’s holding, it is plainly an absurd application of Zeran’s
wording.
As the Craigslist court noted, if a website altered content, then
it would “no longer be posting information provided by ‘another
content provider’ . . . .”155 However, there is nothing in the Zeran
opinion’s wording that forbids the third-party approach from
making the same distinction. In fact, Zeran recognizes that if AOL
had created the illegal content, then the content would no longer
originate from a third party, and third-party immunity would not
apply.156
d. Reaching a Truce: Harmonizing Zeran’s Third-Party
Approach and Craigslist’s Publisher Approach
To interpret the two approaches harmoniously, a court would
need to appropriately apply the Zeran approach in an alteration
situation. It is reasonable to assume that if a website altered content
to the extent of actually creating content, then a court would
correctly identify the site as an information content provider, thus
not entitled to immunity. However, the Craigslist district court
determined that “[t]his is not an idle concern.”157 It worried that
courts were using Zeran to bestow immunity on websites because
they actually altered the content, which would make them
publishers under a literal reading of Zeran.158 The Craigslist
district court feared that courts would end their inquiry there
instead of withholding immunity if it was the website’s alteration
that actually made the comment offensive or defamatory.159
However, the Craigslist court’s fears are quite unfounded. The
court cited three cases that were apparently the best examples of
this abusive application of Zeran’s third-party approach.160 A close
inspection of these cases reveals that the scenario about which
Craigslist was so worried has never actually occurred.161
154.
155.
156.
Zeran,
n.2.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
2006),

Id.
Id.
See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). In
it was undisputed that AOL had not contributed any content. Id. at 330
Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The court began with Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa.
aff’d, 248 Fed. App’x 280, (3d Cir. 2007). There, the district court
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On the contrary, courts that subscribe to the Zeran approach
have been keenly aware of these considerations. Subsequent
jurisprudence relying on Zeran has noted that the immunity status
of publishers who edit content only extends to editing of material
that “retain[s] its basic form and message.”162 Recognition of this
principle has stemmed from § 230’s definition of “information
content provider,” which encompasses any entity that is
responsible, even in part, for the “development” of the content in
question.163 Courts have taken hold of this language, remaining
vigilant in their concern that a website not be permitted to
contribute to the illegality of content.164 It was precisely this
reasoning that led the en banc Ninth Circuit to hold that
Roommates.com was an unprotected content provider when it
forced its users to choose from a list of discriminatory
alternatives.165 The court in Roommates.com even went so far as to
say that those who encourage illegal content may forfeit their CDA

repeatedly noted that the defendant website did not author or create any of the
posts, nor was this even alleged. Id. at 524, 527, 530. The Craigslist court
overlooked the footnote in Dimeo, establishing that if material is altered, “the
material published [must] . . . retai[n] the material’s basic form and message” for
the site to retain its immunity. Id. at 530 n.11. The plaintiff in Dimeo never
alleged such an alteration. Id. at 530. The Craigslist opinion also cited Donato v.
Moldow to support its worries. 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
However, this case quotes the same qualifying language of Dimeo that any
material published must retain its basic form and content in order for immunity
to apply. Id. at 724. The content that the Donato plaintiff alleged to be an
alteration amounted only to deletion of third-party comments and the removal of
vulgarity—publisher activity that is clearly protected under either interpretation
of the CDA. Id. at 716–17, 719–20, 726–27. The Craigslist court also cited Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
2000), a case that involved only deletions, and not alterations, of erroneous
stock information. Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986. Because the deletions considered
in Ben Ezra were legitimate, good-faith deletions of erroneous information, and
not the manipulative, meaning-changing deletions illustrated in supra note 153,
the Craigslist district court’s reference to it is unfounded.
162. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197–99 (10th Cir.
2009) (“We therefore conclude that a service provider is ‘responsible’ for the
development of offensive content . . . if it in some way specifically encourages
development of what is offensive about the content.”); Universal Commc’n Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[Information content
provider] is a broad definition, covering even those who are responsible for the
development of content only ‘in part.’”); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171–75 (9th Cir. 2008).
165. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–66.
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immunity.166 In fact, the vast majority of the “Zeran-approach”
circuits have explicitly left room for liability based on the
inducement of illegal content.167 This should resolve any concerns
of the Craigslist court that Zeran threatens to provide a “limitless
immunity.”168
With these considerations in mind, the effect on SOF.com’s
hitman advertisement is not to be underestimated. Under the Zeran
third-party approach or the publisher approach, SOF.com would
not be liable for the contents of Mr. Savage’s ad. However, if
SOF.com encouraged or induced the ad, then the website would
forfeit its § 230 immunity.
e. Craigslist’s Attack on Zeran: Friendly Fire
This detailed breakdown of the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of
Zeran suggests an interesting possibility. The approach to which
the Seventh Circuit subscribes has no substantive difference from
the Zeran approach that it so explicitly rejects. Acknowledgement
of this premise reconciles the surprising number of cases that
appear to have adopted both the Zeran third-party approach and the
publisher approach recognized by the Seventh Circuit.169 If this is
true, then there is actually an overwhelming majority of courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, currently in agreement on how to
interpret § 230: a unified Zeran–publisher immunity. Indeed, the
subtle distinction between these two “differing” approaches is lost
even on the Fourth Circuit, which recently cited Craigslist to
support its own Zeran § 230 interpretation.170 Although this debate
166. Id. at 1175 (“The message to website operators is clear: If you don’t
encourage illegal content, . . . you will be immune.”).
167. See, e.g., id. (9th Cir. 2008); Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199 (10th Cir.
2009); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2008); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009); Dimeo v. Max,
248 Fed. App’x. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007); Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 421
(1st Cir. 2007).
168. In further support of this notion, the Roommates.com opinion explicitly
announces its complete agreement with the Seventh Circuit’s Craigslist
decision. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172 n.33.
169. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 421–22 (1st Cir. 2007) (both
following Zeran and adopting publisher requirement); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d
465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 258 (4th Cir.
2009) (same); MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); Johnson, 614
F.3d at 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).
170. Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254. In a footnote, the court
acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit interprets § 230 differently but that it is
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may seem pointless, the semantic disagreement between Zeran and
Craigslist has actually been the root of the confusion that has
denied the CDA jurisprudence the uniformity it so badly needs.
C. Cause for Disagreement: Definitional Clauses and a
Definitional Immunity
If jurisprudential discussions of the CDA are to be understood
fully, one must delve deeper into the past. Five years before
Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit first considered the reach of CDA
immunity in Doe v. GTE.171 At the time, the court was not required
to adopt an approach, but it nonetheless spoke on the matter in
dicta, explicitly disagreeing with the third-party approach of
Zeran.172 It was here that the Seventh Circuit first offered the
publisher approach as only a possibility, but it was also here that
the court offered another possibility, a far more extreme departure
from the Zeran holding.173 Spawning a new definitional approach,
the Seventh Circuit posited that § 230(c)(1) could be read “as a
definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability.”174 In
other words, § 230(c)(1) provides no protection, but only provides
the background for § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity. If an
entity did not contribute the content, then it is not a publisher under
§ 230(c)(1) and is therefore eligible for immunity given to Good
Samaritan screeners under § 230(c)(2).175 Conversely, if an entity
did contribute the content, then it is the publisher or speaker of that
content and is ineligible for Good Samaritan screener immunity
under § 230(c)(2).176
This interpretation of § 230 would be revolutionary. It would
effectively erase the entire body of law developed after Zeran.
Under a definitional interpretation, § 230 offers no immunity
unless an entity qualifies as an interactive service provider that did
not contribute the content, and has taken Good Samaritan actions

unaware of the effect of that distinction, of “whatever academic interest that
distinction may be.” Id. at 255 n.4. Nor do other courts honor the distinction
outlined by the Seventh Circuit. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1179–80
(crediting the Seventh, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits with “embrac[ing] this robust
view of [§ 230(c)(1)] immunity . . ..”) (McKeown, J., dissenting).
171. 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 660.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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to restrict access to it.177 If Mr. Savage’s hitman ad on SOF.com
were scrutinized under the definitional approach, then SOF.com
would have no immunity unless the website made Good Samaritan
attempts to filter or remove it or similar ads. Even if SOF.com took
such Good Samaritan steps, § 230(c)(2) would not provide a
blanket immunity, but only a protection from liability “on account
of” those steps.178 The definitional approach effectively limits the
application of § 230 exclusively to scenarios like Stratton, where
the website was punished because it attempted to screen the
offensive content of others.179
Despite the extreme departure from any recognized
interpretation, the Seventh Circuit offered several justifications for
a definitional approach. First, unlike the distinct immunity granted
by § 230(c)(2), § 230(c)(1) is phrased as a definition.180 Second,
the broad third-party immunity of Zeran arguably has the exact
opposite effect of what Congress intended—it encourages websites
and interactive services to do nothing, because taking Good
Samaritan screener steps provides no additional immunity.181
Third, the title of § 230(c) is “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material.”182 Only by limiting
the protection of § 230(c)(1) to Good Samaritan screeners is it
possible to interpret § 230 consistently with its title.183
1. Misplaced Loyalties: The Seventh Circuit and the
Definitional Approach
The definitional approach has not garnered the support of even
one court, including the Seventh Circuit that first offered it as a
possibility. Yet, the reasoning that supports it pervades the cases of
both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.184 The Seventh Circuit
177. Id. at 659–60.
178. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006).
179. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
180. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
181. Id.
182. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
183. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670.
184. See, e.g., id. (“Why not read § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather
than as an immunity from liability . . . ?”); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660
(7th Cir. 2003) (same); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.”); Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[S]ection 230(c) can and should be interpreted
consistent with its caption,” “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening.).
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advanced it only as a possibility in the dicta of Doe v. GTE before
the court settled on the publisher interpretation in Craigslist.185
Because of GTE, though, some courts were under the impression
that the Seventh Circuit had chosen the definitional approach.186
Even the Craigslist decision has not clarified the matter.187 The
Seventh Circuit’s apparent adherence to two conflicting
interpretations can be attributed to the disproportionate attention
the Seventh Circuit allotted to discussing the definitional
interpretation in both the GTE and Craigslist opinions.188 Although
GTE devoted one sentence to suggest the publisher reading, which
the court actually adopted in Craigslist, the GTE opinion devoted
three paragraphs to discussing the definitional approach.189
Five years later, in Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit compounded
the disproportionate analysis it gave to the definitional approach in
GTE by reciting the entire discussion again.190 Unlike the opinion
in GTE, the Craigslist opinion allots a few more sentences to the
publisher approach.191 Even then, the court fails to adopt explicitly
the publisher approach, and likewise fails to reject explicitly the
definitional approach.192 However, Craigslist’s holding makes it
clear that the court applied the publisher approach because it was
“only in a capacity as publisher” that Craigslist could be liable.193
Such a holding grants immunity for publisher actions and is
implicitly incompatible with a definitional view of § 230(c)(1) that
does not recognize any protection absent Good Samaritan blocking
efforts. However, the court’s disproportionate discussion of a view
185. GTE, 347 F.3d at 660.
186. See, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit determined that the CDA is not necessarily
inconsistent with state laws that create liability for interactive service providers
that refrain from filtering or censoring content.”); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Seventh
Circuit, for example, prefers to read ‘§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather
than as an immunity from liability.’”).
187. See Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 255 n.4 (“The Seventh Circuit, for
example, prefers to read ‘§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather than as an
immunity from liability.’ Of whatever academic distinction that may be . . . .”)
(citing Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669) (citations omitted).
188. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669–70; GTE, 347 F.3d at 659–60.
189. GTE, 347 F.3d at 660 (“There is yet another possibility: perhaps §
230(c)(1) forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the [Internet service
provider] a ‘publisher’––defamation law would be a good example of such
liability––while permitting the states to regulate [Internet service providers] in
their capacity as intermediaries.”).
190. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669–70.
191. Id. at 670–71.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 671.
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that it rejected and its lack of an explicit choice combine to create a
misleading and confusing opinion in Craigslist. Because of this
confusion, even the rejected definitional interpretation of §
230(c)(1) has remained relevant.194
2. Mixed Signals: The Ninth Circuit and Definitional
Reasoning
The Seventh Circuit’s Craigslist opinion has misled more than
one court. The Ninth Circuit’s Roommates.com opinion is a salient
example.195 There, the Ninth Circuit adopted the view that §
230(c)(1) provides a publisher immunity.196 However, almost in
passing, the Roommates.com opinion recites much of the argument
advanced by the Seventh Circuit to support the definitional
approach.197
The Roommates.com opinion begins by recognizing that
Congress intended to “immunize the removal of user-generated
content, not the creation of content.”198 Taken literally, this
proposition challenges the utility of awarding § 230 immunity in
situations other than those where the online entity is liable for
removing someone else’s content, which only Good Samaritan
screeners do.199 The Roommates.com court next contended that it
was “perhaps the only purpose” of § 230 to overrule the specific
problem that occurred in Stratton.200 However, by recognizing only
§ 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity, it is the definitional
approach that is limited precisely to “overrul[ing]” the specific
problem that occurred in Stratton.201 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
joined the Seventh Circuit in finding that “[i]ndeed, the section is
194. It is some version of this interpretation that the Fourth Circuit credits to
the Seventh Circuit, even after Craigslist. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Seventh
Circuit, for example, prefers to read ‘§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather
than as an immunity from liability.’”).
195. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2008).
196. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
197. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163–64.
198. Id. at 1163. (emphasis added)
199. The en banc Ninth Circuit continued by reciting the legislative history
of § 230, emphasizing repeatedly that it was designed to protect those who
restrict offensive content. See id. (emphasizing “restriction” twice). Again,
limiting § 230’s immunity to restrictions of content is not consistent with an
immunity that extends to all publishers but is only consistent with a definitional
approach.
200. Id. at 1163 n.12.
201. See id. at 1163. The website in Stratton faced liability for attempting to
screen others’ content as a “Good Samaritan.” Id.
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titled ‘Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of
offensive material’ and . . . the substance of section 230(c) can and
should be interpreted consistent with its caption.”202
These arguments support only one interpretation of § 230: the
definitional approach. A court cannot interpret the Good Samaritan
title of § 230(c) consistently with its substance and still find that it
applies outside the context of Good Samaritan blocking. Nor can a
court genuinely argue that the “only purpose” of § 230 is to
overrule Stratton, and then apply § 230 to any context where the
website does not attempt to restrict content as did the website in
Stratton. In spite of all this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit formally
adheres to the Zeran-publisher approach.203 As time has shown,
without correction, this confusion threatens to further complicate
the already cloudy CDA jurisprudence.
D. The Conflict Escalates: The Ninth Circuit, Barnes v. Yahoo,
and a Reverse Definitional Approach
It was not long before the Ninth Circuit was forced to explain
its Roommates.com holding. In 2009, Barnes v. Yahoo! forced the
Ninth Circuit to confront the conflict between its publisher
immunity standard and its definitional immunity reasoning.204
Compared to other cases, it should have been an easy decision. The
plaintiff, Cecilia Barnes, much like the plaintiff in Zeran, was the
victim of a fake Internet profile.205 This time the profile
proclaimed the plaintiff’s promiscuity and sexual deviancy.206 The
court easily identified her claim as an attempt to hold the Yahoo
website liable for its role as a publisher, and held that publisher
immunity barred the claim.207 However, Barnes’s complaint
included one argument the Ninth Circuit had to address separately.
1. The Reconciliation
Even though the court held that publisher immunity applied,
Barnes’s complaint forced the court into a corner. She cited the
court’s own en banc opinion in Roommates.com to remind the
court that the purpose of § 230 was to encourage websites to take
202. Id. at 1163−64. The court even explicitly cited to the Seventh Circuit
cases of both Craigslist and GTE for support. Id.
203. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163–64.
204. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
205. Id. at 1098.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1102–04.
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action, “not to provide an excuse for doing nothing.”208 The Barnes
court went on to reaffirm that reasoning209 and reaffirm the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, all the while supporting an
argument for a strictly definitional reading of § 230(c)(1).210
Finally, the court acknowledged that its citation to differing
interpretations was an “apparent contradiction,” and so attempted
to resolve it.211
The Ninth Circuit panel in Barnes began its explanation by
reciting the publisher interpretation of § 230(c).212 However, the
court continued with an attempted explanation of the “apparent
contradiction” between its adoption of the publisher approach and
its praise for the reasoning of the definitional approach.213 It next
established that it is “crucia[l]” to understand that § 230(c)(2)
protects:
not merely those whom subsection (c)(1) already protects,
but any provider of an interactive computer service. Thus,
even those who cannot take advantage of subsection (c)(1),
perhaps because they developed, even in part, the content at
issue, can take advantage of subsection (c)(2) if they act to
restrict access to the content because they consider it
obscene or otherwise objectionable.214
2. Stalling for Time: The Reverse Definitional Interpretation of
Barnes
The Barnes reasoning is extremely confusing, and the court’s
opinion contains no further explanation or application. However, it
appears to provide a third level of immunity––one that a content
provider or creator is eligible for “if they act to restrict access to
[the content] . . . .”215 The Ninth Circuit has effectively retained the
208. Id. at 1105.
209. Id. (“It would indeed be strange for a provision so captioned to provide
equal protection as between internet service providers who do nothing and those
who attempt to block and screen offensive material.”).
210. The court also cited Craigslist in support of its notion that “Subsection
(c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.” Id. at 1100. It joined the
Seventh Circuit in doing so, but it, too, failed to explain how its protection is
something other than an immunity. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
211. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.
212. Id. Under this interpretation, § 230(c)(1) protects websites from being
held liable as publishers, and § 230(c)(2) protects websites from liability for
Good Samaritan steps to restrict access. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id.
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effects of the prevalent § 230 interpretation unchanged. It has also
added, however, a completely new immunity for which only good
faith screeners who are also content providers are eligible.216 If Mr.
Savage’s hitman ad is reconsidered under this approach, the
consequences are startling. According to the Barnes court,
SOF.com could actually help Mr. Savage create the hitman ad,
display it on the website, and then gain immunity by subsequently
taking steps to restrict access to it.
The Barnes opinion, while attempting to reach a publisher
immunity conclusion, defends definitional immunity reasoning
while creating a brand new interpretation: a “reverse definitional
immunity.” The Barnes interpretation could be called “reverse,”
because a definitional reading of § 230(c)(1) establishes which
parties are eligible for the Good Samaritan screener immunity of §
230(c)(2); Barnes, however, creates an immunity for someone who
is completely ineligible for the definitional qualification of §
230(c)(1): a website that, although a content provider, has made
efforts to screen that provide immunity under § 230(c)(2).217 In this
maze of statutory inbreeding, it is easy to miss that this explanation
does not change anything about the “apparent contradiction:” a §
230(c)(1) publisher approach protects websites that do nothing.
E. A Resilient Survivor: Strict Publisher Immunity
The four CDA approaches discussed above comprise the bulk,
if not all, of “active” § 230 interpretations. Nonetheless, there is at
least one other approach that remains relevant despite its lack of
judicial embrace—the approach that the Fourth Circuit rejected in
Zeran.218 The “strict publisher” approach accepts the immunity of
the publisher approach, but applied only to a restricted category of
publishers.219
The strict publisher approach contends that the publisher
immunity of § 230(c)(1) precludes only the strict liability that
direct publishers traditionally faced. This interpretation leaves
room for the notice- or knowledge-based liability of distributors.220
Applying the same reasoning to online entities, § 230(c)(1) would
immunize a website only from strict liability as a publisher of
third-party content. However, if they were aware of its subject
matter and dissemination, these same websites could be held liable
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See id.
See id.
See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 331.
See id.
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as distributors of third-party content. In the SOF.com hitman ad
scenario, SOF.com would be immune from liability as a publisher.
However, as a distributor, SOF.com would be immune from
liability for Mr. Savage’s ad only until the website was notified of
the ad’s existence.
F. The Battle Rages On: Other Interpretations
One should not take this Comment’s enumeration of § 230
approaches to imply a limit. Although the five approaches described
above have garnered the most attention and commentary, § 230 has
an uncanny ability to inspire judicial and interpretive creativity. One
judge has suggested that CDA immunity should apply only when
the website takes no active role in selecting which content gets
published, something the Zeran–publisher approach permits under
the protected traditional acts of a publisher.221 Others have
suggested that courts adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances approach,
weighing context-specific factors in each case.222 There is also no
shortage of commentators, including judges who appear to have
followed Zeran only begrudgingly, and who wait for Congress or
courts to begin remodeling the CDA.223 Until Congress or the
Supreme Court finally settles this dispute, every one of these
approaches remains viable.

221. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J.,
dissenting).
222. Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the
Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1324–31 (2010).
Zieglowsky suggests that courts undertake a fact-intensive totality of the
circumstances approach to determine the culpability of a website for a given
display of content. Factors to be considered might include the purpose of the
website, the importance of freedom of speech, anonymity, responses to removal
requests, and financial gain. Id.
223. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.C. 1998)
(“While it appears to this Court that AOL in this case has taken advantage of all
the benefits conferred by Congress in the [CDA], and then some, without
accepting any of the burdens that Congress intended, the statutory language is
clear . . . .”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (“We
acknowledge that recognizing broad immunity for defamatory republications on
the Internet has some troubling consequences. Until Congress chooses to revise
the settled law in this area, however, plaintiffs who contend they were defamed
in an Internet posting may only seek recovery from the original source of the
statement.”); see also Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers
from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55
VAND. L. REV. 647, 672–73 (2002); Zieglowsky, supra note 222; Freiwald,
supra note 70, at 643–54; Spencer, supra note 102, at 178.
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IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: REGROUPING AND REFINING
It is understandably intimidating for a court to interpret the
CDA today. Section 230’s jurisprudence is a rare example of such
extreme complexity, disarray, and importance in case law, yet it
lacks a single guiding Supreme Court decision. A court unfamiliar
with the history of the statute and unaware of its differing
interpretations faces a daunting challenge. After gaining an
understanding of the law, however, courts could create a uniform
body of § 230 jurisprudence that is balanced, equitable, and finally
in harmony.
A. The Victor Leaves the Battlefield
The prospect of unity in the jurisprudence of the CDA is an
attractive concept. The parallel application of the Zeran third-party
approach and publisher approach is perhaps the only method to
achieve this goal. A unified Zeran–publisher approach
acknowledges the unity of the two approaches, and singlehandedly embraces the bulk of the CDA’s jurisprudential analyses.
1. The Perceived Inequities of a Zeran–Publisher Approach
There has been no shortage of critics of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Zeran.224 Some wonder why websites should
experience such an unfair advantage over traditional print
media.225 Moreover, some feel a broad immunity is a
disproportionate legislative response to the problem Congress
sought to correct in Stratton.226 Others disapprove of the prospect
of immunizing websites that acquiesce to or benefit from their
users’ illegal content.227
a. Websites vs. Newspapers: Unfair Treatment?
Some critics take issue with the disparate treatment now
experienced by the brick-and-mortar counterparts of websites, such
as newspapers and newsstands, which face immensely greater
exposure for content that websites can allow freely.228 A physical
224. See supra note 102.
225. See, e.g., Melissa A. Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1483
(2006).
226. See, e.g., Sheridan, supra note 102, at 179.
227. Zieglowsky, supra note 222, at 1331.
228. Sheridan, supra note 102, at 149–150.
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newspaper’s classified ad or opinion section remains within the
realm of strict liability, but an online newspaper’s classified ad or
comments section is immune.229 Returning briefly to the story of
Mr. Savage and Soldier of Fortune magazine,230 his victim’s family
received $4 million when the magazine displayed Savage’s hitman
ad.231 Yet, it is troubling to acknowledge that if Soldier of Fortune
magazine is eclipsed by SOF.com, the same classified ad displayed
on the website would result in no similar form of liability.
Although this concession is seemingly unfair, it is necessary in
light of the interests at stake. Looking to the legislative debate
surrounding the CDA, this result is the unavoidable and, indeed,
intended result of the CDA.232 Unlike their physical equivalents,
many online services operate in such a way that every single
comment by a third-party user is automatically posted, with the
number of comments and posts on a given website reaching into
the millions.233 A comprehensive monitoring system on heavilytrafficked websites might be financially burdensome, unfeasible, or
impossible. As Congress observed, it is the open-ended nature of
such websites that makes them both so attractive and so difficult to
monitor, and therefore so in need of protection.234
b. Publisher Liability vs. Distributor Liability: Knowledge is
Not Power
Even if the proposition of limited liability for online content is
accepted, perhaps Congress intended that actual knowledge of a
defamatory or illegal post could still subject a website to liability.235
This was the brunt of the plaintiff’s argument in Zeran—a strict
publisher approach contending that § 230 should not foreclose the
common law notion of distributor liability.236 The strict publisher
approach would impose distributor liability on a website if it was
notified of illegal content.237 In the Soldier of Fortune hypothetical,
229. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
230. See supra Part I.
231. See Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1114
(11th Cir. 1992).
232. 141 CONG. REC. 22,047 (1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“We have
been told it is technologically impossible for interactive service providers to
guarantee that no subscriber posts indecent material on their bulletin board
services.”).
233. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
234. 141 CONG. REC. 22,045–46 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
235. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
236. See id. at 331.
237. Id.
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this would permit SOF.com to face liability for a hitman ad if the
website was notified or knew of its illegal or dangerous nature.
Despite these troubling worst-case scenarios, the unified Zeran–
publisher approach explicitly accepts this risk.238 This has troubling
implications, such as leaving no incentive for websites like AOL or
SOF.com to take down extremely damaging or even dangerous
posts they know to exist.239 However, such concerns are not
dispositive. As the Zeran court pointed out, § 230(c)(1) precludes
any form of publisher liability.240 There is a distinction between
publishers and distributors, but traditional defamation law suggests
that a distributor is only one form of the more general classification
of publisher.241 The wording of § 230(c)(1) is much too general to
read such a context-specific distinction into the statute.242
Moreover, in passing § 230, Congress sought to prevent
websites from being punished for attempts to screen content.243
Distributor liability threatens this congressional goal, because the
prospect of liability for knowledge might discourage websites from
allowing themselves to ever become aware of offensive content.244
Websites might remove any system of formal notification so that
they cannot have knowledge imputed to them.245 A website might
also face a substantial burden if it must investigate every complaint
it receives, or else face liability.246 As the Zeran court feared,
websites might choose instead to just remove all content that is
complained about, without regard to its offensiveness or the
resulting chilling effect on free speech.247
Finally, courts should give due deference to the congressional
response to the prevailing Zeran–publisher approach. In 2002, a
conference committee report of the House of Representatives
signaled its complete approval of the jurisprudential application of
238. Id. at 333.
239. One court even applied § 230 to immunize a website where a plaintiff
alleged that the site had actual knowledge of child pornography being posted. See
Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, slip op.
at 9–10 (E.D. Tex. 2006); 35 Media L. Rep. 1435 at *3–4. The plaintiffs, parents
on behalf of their minor child, accused Yahoo of knowingly profiting from the
existence of Yahoo chatrooms devoted to child pornography. Doe, slip op. at 6–7.
Whether Yahoo actually had such knowledge was not proven, and was indeed
unlikely. Id.
240. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 332–33.
244. Id. at 333.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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this approach, explicitly endorsing Zeran and two other cases that
have followed the Zeran–publisher interpretation.248 Such informal
approval should not dissuade a court from following a statute’s
wording, but it does prove that Congress is satisfied with § 230’s
effect and will not support any other interpretation of the statute.
2. A Unified Alliance: The Zeran–Publisher Approach
The Zeran–publisher approach is not perfect. Like any
approach, it has negative consequences. It is no easy task to
balance the competing interests of uninhibited information
exchange with guaranteed liability for abuses of that exchange.
However, the Zeran–publisher approach represents the best policy
decision. Uninhibited defamation and illegal content without any
hope of a website’s intervention is more of a danger in theory than
in practice. In reality, public relations considerations alone are
enough to induce a website to remove illegal content. Immunity in
spite of knowledge could potentially protect websites who
downright refuse to remove illegal content. More often, however,
such expansive immunity will operate to protect innocent websites
from having knowledge imputed to them by virtue of a complaint
of which they may not actually be aware.
The Zeran–publisher approach offers the best method to courts
faced with the CDA today. Its wording is grounded in the statutory
language of § 230 and is most capable of honoring the intent of the
statute.249 It balances the desire to protect websites from an
impossible burden with the desire to hold creators of illegal content
liable. Its widespread acceptance offers uniformity amid a
disheveled jurisprudence.
3. The Zeran–Publisher Approach—Adaptability and Capability
Courts have proven exceptionally capable at adapting and
shaping the limits of the Zeran–publisher approach. The Seventh
Circuit was correct to be wary of a strict application of Zeran, but
248. H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 13 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). In a conference
committee report that accompanied new legislation, the committee specifically
indicated: “The Committee notes that [Internet service providers] have
successfully defended many lawsuits using section 230(c). The courts have
correctly interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at protecting against
liability for such claims as negligence . . . and defamation ([10th Circuit case
following Zeran]; Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)). The
Committee intends these interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally
applicable to those entities covered by [new legislation].”
249. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2006).
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other courts have limited it appropriately to retain the spirit of §
230 and align Zeran’s third-party immunity with the Seventh
Circuit’s publisher immunity.250 In particular, the Ninth Circuit has
done an exemplary job of preventing any unfair application of the
prevailing approach.251 Faced with Roommates.com’s requirement
that its customers choose discriminatory roommate preferences, the
court carefully considered to what extent Roommates.com
“developed” the content.252 Leaving the spirit of § 230 intact, the
court recognized that although it was the customers who ultimately
entered their discriminatory choice, it was the website that had
effectively created the content by forcing its customers to do so.253
As mentioned earlier, courts have already suggested that any
culpable behavior by a website will not go unnoticed.254 As many
as seven federal circuits have signaled that encouraging or
inducing a third party to create questionable content might be
sufficient to forfeit immunity.255 The courts’ proven readiness to
adapt the Zeran–publisher approach to common sense notions of
equity makes it an especially attractive alternative.256
B. The Remnants of Defeat: The Remains of Alternative Approaches
If courts recognize the unity of the Zeran–publisher approach,
any other approach will exist only as a minority view. However,
because of its unfavorable consequences, plaintiffs repeatedly
250. See supra notes 167, 169.
251. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165–69 (9th Cir. 2008) (not permitting
website to encourage illegal content); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1106–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (not permitting website to apply immunity to liability
for subsequent promises regarding content).
252. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–69.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 1175 (“If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your
website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”); Chi.
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that any inducement of illegal
content would not be protected); see also supra note 167.
255. See supra note 167.
256. One Ninth Circuit opinion deserves particular recognition for its astute
reasoning. Ironically, this ruling was a completely separate part of the Barnes v.
Yahoo opinion. 570 F.3d 1096, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009). Creating the reverse
definitional immunity in response to the plaintiff’s negligence complaint, the
Ninth Circuit also faced a separate complaint for promissory estoppel to which
neither publisher immunity nor reverse definitional immunity applied. See id.
The court found that § 230 did not forbid holding Yahoo liable for its
representative’s promise that it would immediately remove the ad, if the plaintiff
relied on that promise to her detriment. Id. at 1106–09.
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attempt to persuade courts to apply alternative interpretations of §
230. Without a Supreme Court decision to bind the circuits, there
is nothing to prevent a federal circuit from changing its
interpretation. Also, recognizing the supporting reasoning behind
these alternative interpretations can help courts avoid the result of
inadvertently supporting a conflicting approach in dicta.
1. The Definitional Approach as a Viable Alternative
Despite its lack of support, the definitional approach arguably
finds much greater support in the statute’s intent, title, and
structure.257 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that this approach
would harmonize the statute with its purpose and its title,
“Protection for Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening . . . .”258
The court acknowledged that Zeran has been followed by four
federal circuits, yet it could not reconcile it with the language of §
230(c)(1).259 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in GTE questions the
utility of immunizing interactive computer services under §
230(c)(1) for doing nothing, when the entire purpose underlying its
enactment was to prevent interactive services from doing nothing.260
a. The Definitional Approach and the Structure of § 230
The trouble with rejecting the definitional approach is that it
makes sense. Indeed, at the time of its enactment, the definitional
reading of § 230 was possibly exactly what Congress had in mind.
This partially explains why it has been so easy for a court like the
Ninth Circuit to unwittingly support the definitional approach in its
257. It should be noted that some courts also characterize the publisher
interpretation of the Seventh Circuit as definitional. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 255 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Seventh
Circuit, for example, prefers to read ‘§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather
than as an immunity from liability.’”). Craigslist appears to affirm that the
Seventh Circuit shares this view. 519 F.3d at 670 (“Why not read § 230(c)(1) as
a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability . . . ?”). However,
as explained earlier, regardless of its name, the Seventh Circuit publisher
protection operates as an immunity. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.a. The
only truly definitional reading of § 230 is the one offered by GTE and rejected
by Craigslist. See discussion supra Part III.C.
258. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
259. Id. at 659–60 (citing the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
260. Id. at 660 (“Yet § 230(c) . . . bears the title ‘Protection for “Good
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material,’ hardly an apt
description if its principal effect is to induce [Internet service providers] to do
nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their
services.”).
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reasoning.261 Any interpretation of § 230 that pretends to be
completely in harmony with the statute’s structure, wording,
purpose, and history will have trouble defending that assertion.
This is why it is important to acknowledge and concede the
shortcomings of the unified Zeran–publisher approach.
The very structure of the statute supports the definitional
approach. As the district court in Craigslist noted, it defies
principles of statutory interpretation to interpret § 230(c)(2) to
provide an immunity with its definitive wording—“No provider . . .
shall be liable . . . .”—and to simultaneously interpret § 230(c)(1) to
provide an even greater immunity without any equivalent
wording.262 A broad publisher immunity reading of § 230(c)(1) also
renders § 230(c)(2) completely superfluous. By interpreting §
230(c)(1) to cover all publishing acts, a Good Samaritan screener
never even needs to resort to the Good Samaritan immunity in §
230(c)(2).263
Another recurring argument for the definitional approach is the
title of § 230(c): “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material.”264 This title encompasses both §
230(c)(1) and § 230(c)(2), yet the Zeran–publisher approach posits
that a Good Samaritan requirement is only applicable to §
230(c)(2).265 However, this inconsistency in the title is not enough
261. See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2008); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d
1096, 1100-05 (9th Cir. 2009).
262. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under The Law v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693–94 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2008); see also City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)
(“‘[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely’
when it ‘includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another.’” (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))).
263. Some courts have disagreed with this statement, pointing out that unlike
§ 230(c)(1), § 230(c)(2)’s immunity would provide immunity from liability to
the content-provider where the website wrongfully removed its content. See,
e.g., GTE, 347 F.3d at 660 (characterizing § 230 as “designed to eliminate
[Internet service providers’] liability to the creators of offensive material”);
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520–21 (Cal. 2006). It is possible that this
could happen, but it is highly unlikely that third-party content-providers have
First Amendment or any other rights on a private party’s website in the first
place. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by government,
federal or state.”). Not surprisingly, this function of § 230(c)(2) remains much
more convincing in theory than in practice.
264. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
265. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have made this same point, albeit
in support of the Zeran–publisher approach. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1164 (“[T]he substance of section 230(c) can and should be interpreted
consistent with its caption.”); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
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to make the definitional approach a superior alternative to the
Zeran–publisher approach. It is elementary that a statute’s
provisions trump its title if the two conflict.266 It is the substance
and not the title of statutes that grant them effect, and § 230(c)(1)
has no Good Samaritan requirement.267
b. The Definitional Approach and the Intent of § 230
If a court claims that the only reason for enacting § 230 was to
counteract the troubling Stratton decision, it can support only a
definitional approach.268 Stratton was outrageous because it
punished a website for attempting to screen offensive content,
when the website would have faced no liability if it had simply
allowed offensive content to be posted freely.269 If § 230 was
meant only to prevent a similar injustice from occurring again,
then only § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity is needed. If
that is the case, § 230(c)(1) should be read as definitional.
However, this argument also fails because the assertion that § 230
was meant exclusively to prevent a Stratton situation is not
necessarily true. The House Conference Committee’s report
recognizes that it is only “[o]ne of the specific purposes” of § 230
to overrule Stratton and similar decisions.270 Further, the CDA’s
congressional debate recognized the impossible burden that
websites face if they can be held liable for third-party content, even
if they do not make attempts to screen offensive content.271 The
congressional concern about this burden suggests that a narrow
definitional reading of § 230 was not its intent.

Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). If this
does not make sense to the reader, it is not supposed to. Herein lies much of the
confusion caused by the comingling of competing § 230 interpretations.
266. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256
(2004) (“The caption of a statute, this Court has cautioned, ‘cannot undo or limit
that which the [statute’s] text makes plain.’”) (citing Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947)).
267. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006).
268. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.12 (stating that “it seems to be
the principal or perhaps the only purpose” of § 230 to overrule Stratton).
269. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
270. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added)
(“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v.
Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have
restricted access to objectionable material.”).
271. See 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte).
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Finally, perhaps the most convincing argument for a definitional
approach, and one that has stumped the Ninth Circuit,272 is the
reward of Zeran–publisher immunity to websites that do nothing to
screen content when § 230 was enacted specifically to motivate
websites to take action. However, Congress also did not want
websites to face the burden of liability for third-party content.273
Protection for websites that do nothing is the price the Zeran–
publisher approach accepts in order to guarantee that websites are
never punished for third-party content. As discussed earlier, only by
providing immunity to all websites––even those with knowledge
and even those who do nothing––can websites be fully encouraged
to participate in the content-screening process.
For all its logical and structural validity, the definitional
approach remains inferior to the Zeran–publisher approach.
Section 230 was meant to provide substantial protection to
websites that permit third parties to contribute content. The limited
immunity of a definitional approach plainly falls short of this.
Although the definitional approach is supported by certain canons
of statutory interpretation, nothing can change the plain wording of
§ 230(c)(1): “No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”274
2. An Imminent Conflict: The Viability of the Barnes Reverse
Definitional Approach
In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit provided the first and only version
of a reverse definitional approach.275 The court explained that its
approach was derived from a recognition of the congressional intent
to reward only those websites which take affirmative actions—now,
providers of content who are ineligible for immunity under §
230(c)(1) can obtain immunity under § 230(c)(2) if they restrict
access to that content.276 This interpretation of § 230(c)(2) does not
change the actual “apparent contradiction” the court was claiming to
address: the sweeping immunity that § 230(c)(1) gives to those
websites that do nothing to control content.277
The reverse definitional approach also runs contrary to any
supportable reasoning because it conflicts with the words, history,
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009).
See 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2006).
See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.
See id.
See id.
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and intent of the CDA. According to Barnes, websites can create
offensive content and then obtain immunity by acting “to restrict
access to the content because they consider it obscene.”278 This may
not run into the problem of rewarding immunity for doing nothing,
but it does something even more unacceptable: it rewards immunity
to a website that actively creates the content.279 Surely, if it makes
no sense to reward passivity, as the Ninth Circuit claims, then it is
absurd to reward obscene activity.280
Additionally, the very wording of the statute forbids this result.
Section 230(c)(2)(A) immunizes only actions “taken in good
faith,” an unlikely description for the actions of someone who has
already been determined to be the creator of obscene, defamatory,
or illegal content.281 It is equally unlikely that Congress would ever
create a legal immunity for obscenity-providers that have a change
of heart. The Communications Decency Act was meant to foster
Internet growth and prevent the unregulated proliferation of
obscenity online.282 If it stretches the CDA’s purpose to immunize
websites that make no effort to filter third-party obscenity, then it
mocks the CDA’s purpose to immunize a creator of obscenity for
not successfully blocking its own content. If the reverse
definitional approach of Barnes is ever questioned, the Ninth
Circuit most certainly faces a confusing and losing battle.
Conversely, by returning to the unified Zeran–publisher approach,
the Ninth Circuit can at once embrace the most viable approach
and rejoin the judicial consensus.
3. Stubborn Survivor: The Strict Publisher Interpretation
The “strict publisher” interpretation of § 230(c) is similar to the
Zeran–publisher approach, but it leaves room for interactive
service providers to face liability for content of which they are
aware. The strict publisher interpretation remains a minority view,
but its popularity among scholars283 and plaintiffs284 continues to
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)-(b) (2006); See also 141 CONG. REC. 16,009 (1995).
283. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 223, at 678; Freiwald, supra note 70, at 596;
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 154 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d,
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) (listing scholarly disagreement).
284. See, e.g., Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1103–04; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107
(C.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 481 F.3d 751
(9th Cir. 2007); Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389, 392 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2005); Doe v. AOL, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013–17 (Fla. 2001).

2012]

COMMENT

483

make it relevant. Whether Congress intended a broad protection for
those websites that knowingly permit the posting of defamatory or
illegal content is still the subject of controversy.285 The strict
publisher approach is arguably a fairer balance of the competing
congressional goals of Internet growth and obscenity control.286
Under this approach, websites, as distributors, would still not face
liability for third-party content. However, if websites are notified
of illegal or obscene content, they would be forced to remove it––
something websites should do.
The fairness of this approach is attractive, but it too must yield
to the Zeran–publisher approach. As discussed earlier, liability
upon notice presents the triple threat of (1) encouraging websites to
remove any complaint system whereby they might have knowledge
imputed to them, (2) the unbearable burden of considering every
complaint received, and (3) the risk that websites will just remove
all controversial content, thus chilling speech.287 A website that
refuses to remove horribly defamatory or obscene content is more
of a danger in theory than in practice. The Zeran–publisher
approach recognizes this risk, too, but has made the determination
that punishing innocent conduits of information is the greater and
far more likely injustice.
C. Tending to the Wounded: Refining a Chaotic Jurisprudence
A few courts have already helped to create harmony by
acknowledging the nearly-uniform jurisprudence that has spread
with the Zeran–publisher immunity interpretation of § 230.288
However, the process is not nearly complete. When the Seventh
Circuit refused to identify its publisher protection as an immunity,
it injected substantial confusion into the analysis. The result is an
illusion of disagreement.289 Both of the widely-adopted
approaches––the Zeran third-party approach and the publisher
approach––are carefully applied in the same way to extend
285. Sheridan, supra note 102.
286. See id. at 172–78. There is a convincing application of this approach by
the California Court of Appeals in Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). However, the California Supreme Court swiftly overturned
this case to reunite California’s jurisprudence with Zeran. Barrett v. Rosenthal,
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
287. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33.
288. See, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.
2006); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010).
289. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2008) (offering both a definitional
approach and a publisher approach, but not explicitly adopting or rejecting either
one); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (same).
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immunity only when the defendant is acting in its publisher
capacity.290 The Seventh Circuit must reconcile its own publisher
approach with the Zeran publisher approach and recognize that
they are indeed the same—a unified Zeran–publisher immunity.
Courts must also be mindful of the impure applications of this
unified Zeran–publisher approach. Specifically, this Comment
cautions against the continued misapplication of definitional
reasoning by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. These particularly
influential courts must use their roles to clarify the state of the law.
Both circuits must abandon the reasoning of the definitional
approach that has infiltrated their respective opinions.291 If their
respective courts are going to recognize any form of protection
derived from § 230(c)(1), they must recognize that it functions as
more than a definition.292 If they are going to protect websites that
do not take steps to screen content and become Good Samaritan
screeners, then they must stop demanding that the entire text of the
statute relate only to its title,293 and they must stop claiming that
the CDA should be limited to overruling Stratton.294
Finally, if the Ninth Circuit recognizes that it has mistakenly
signaled approval of a definitional reading of § 230, it must
acknowledge that the jurisprudential inbreeding is the only thing
responsible for its makeshift § 230 interpretation in Barnes.295 It has
290. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
291. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670 (“Why not read § 230(c)(1) as a definitional
clause rather than as an immunity from liability . . . ?”); Fair Hous. Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[S]ection 230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its
caption,” “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening.).
292. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669 (“We have questioned whether §
230[(c)](1) creates any form of ‘immunity,’ . . . . Subsection (c)(1) does not
mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.”); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Craigslist); see also GTE, 347 F.3d at 660.
293. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (“[T]he substance of section
230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its caption.”); Craigslist,
519 F.3d at 670 (“Yet § 230(c) . . . bears the title ‘Protection for “Good
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material’. . . . Why not . . .
harmonize the text with the caption?”); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105 (“It would
indeed be strange for a provision so captioned to provide equal protection as
between internet service providers who do nothing and those who attempt to
block and screen offensive material.”).
294. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163 n.12 (“[I]t seems to be the
principal or perhaps the only purpose” of § 230 to overrule Stratton.).
295. Although Barnes has yet to be cited for its troubling proposition, there is
still cause for concern. As a panel opinion of the Ninth Circuit, it is binding on all
other panel decisions until it is overturned by an en banc decision. See Murray v.
Cable NBC, 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996). This same challenge may also be an
obstacle to any attempt to officially renounce the definitional reasoning of the
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effectively created a broad new approach that potentially immunizes
the creation of defamatory and other illegal content.296 By
renouncing the definitional reasoning dicta utilized by
Roommates.com and Barnes, the court will not be forced into the
same corner again.
V. CONCLUSION
No approach to the CDA can offer both a broad immunity to
websites and a broad protection to potential victims of defamation,
discrimination, or any other illegal content. Every interpretation of
the CDA suffers from some form of conflicting reasoning, ignored
legislative intent, or unfavorable result. These considerations are
indeed competing, and the inherent result is compromise. A unified
Zeran–publisher approach is the only interpretation of § 230 that
protects the interests of both prudence and justice. Allowing
SOF.com to gain immunity after Mr. Savage posts his ad on the
website is the only way to encourage the website to screen content
fearlessly and fairly. Both Congress297 and the courts298 wisely
prefer this result to its converse—a website that faces liability for
the content of millions of posts it cannot read, and instead prefers
not to let third parties communicate any ideas on its forum.
Courts face a tough challenge if they hope to refine the CDA’s
jurisprudence. They must become keenly aware of the varying
interpretations of § 230. The differing interpretive approaches have
collided dramatically in a cloud of conflict, feigned agreement, and
illusions of disagreement. It is time to pick up the pieces of the
CDA’s jurisprudence, sweep away the debris, and recognize the
legacy of the Zeran–publisher approach.
Ryan French∗

Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com, which was itself an en banc decision, also
binding on the entire Ninth Circuit. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157.
296. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.
297. See 141 CONG. REC. 22,045−46 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden)
(recognizing the importance of a vibrant Internet and the impossibility of
charging open websites with controlling content).
298. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because the
probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on
service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes,
we will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact.”).
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